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THE LONG ARM OF U.S. LAW: THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act),' extraterrito-
rial legislation seems to be in vogue.2 Passed during the politically
charged atmosphere of the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign, the
Act uses two principal methods to counter the recent effort by Cu-
ban President Fidel Castro to bolster Cuba's faltering economy by
luring foreign investors to the island. 3 First, the Act allows U.S.
nationals to sue foreign individuals or corporations for using prop-
erty that U.S. nationals once owned, but that the Cuban govern-
ment has since expropriated.4 Second, the Act bars U.S. entry to
individuals who are using such expropriated property individually
or through their companies.
5
The Helms-Burton Act purports to advance liberty and de-
mocracy in Cuba by hastening the end of the Castro regime. It
thus appears to be little more than an extension of the decades-old
U.S. embargo aimed at bringing down the Castro government. Al-
though this aim is not new-the United States has been trying to
topple the Cuban dictator for over thirty-five years6-the means
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-
Burton), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996). The Act is generally referred to as the Helms-
Burton Act for its two principal sponsors, North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms and Indi-
ana Congressman Dan Burton.
2. Shortly after the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, Congress passed another ex-
traterritorial measure, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110
Stat. 1541.
3. For a description of the impetus leading to the passage of the Helms-Burton Act,
see Steven Erlanger, Tough Talk Aside, Helms and His Senate Committee Barely Alter
Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at A8; see also LEY No. 77: LA LEY DE LA
INVERSION [ACT No. 77: FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT], reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 331 (1996)
(discussing the Cuban foreign investment strategy).
4. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081-6085.
5. See id. § 6091.
6. The United States has made several attempts to defeat Castro, including the
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currently chosen depart from previous tactics. Historically, the
United States has placed restrictions on the activities of U.S. citi-
zens and companies in Cuba, including commercial restrictions on
U.S. companies operating in Cuba.
The irony of this latest U.S. initiative is that it runs counter to
two significant trends. First, as a result of the end of the Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union, countries feel
less compelled to follow the U.S. lead in many ventures from po-
litical to military. 7 Second, the international trade system has be-
come increasingly interdependent. 8 The former suggests that the
United States should act in a way that induces foreign countries to
follow its lead in international affairs. The latter counsels against
taking bold unilateral actions in foreign and trade policy matters at
a time when nations are moving toward more interdependent
trade arrangements and relying on bilateral and multilateral trade
cooperation rather than unilateral mechanisms such as quotas and
tariffs.
At first glance, the Helms-Burton Act is nothing more than a
U.S. foreign policy limited to Cuba. Upon deeper inspection,
however, the Act affects various countries,9 business interests, 10 in-
ternational trade agreements,1" and ultimately, international law
itself. 12 Indeed, countries around the world-many of which are
failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, bungled assassination attempts, and even a plot to
make Castro's infamous beard fall out. See LOCH K. JOHNSON, AMERICA'S SECRET
POWER 67 (1989).
7. See generally Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Strategic Moment, WASH. Q., Winter 1996,
at 5.
8. See generally Jeffrey E. Garten, Is America Abandoning Multilateral Trade?,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 50. Garten states that "expanded trade is now more
critical to America's future than at any other time in this century." Id. at 51-52.
9. The law has primarily affected countries that do substantial business in Cuba, in-
cluding Canada, Mexico, and the countries of the European Union. See Dick Kirschten,
The Big Chill, NAT'L J., June 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10107373.
10. Many U.S. and international businesses are concerned about the Helms-Burton
Act's chilling effect on foreign investment and the potential effects of retaliatory efforts
by countries adversely affected by the Act will have on the global trading system. See dis-
cussion infra Part V.
11. The Canadian and Mexican governments have charged that the Helms-Burton
Act conflicts with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See discussion
infra Part IV.B.1. The Canadian and Mexican governments, along with the European
Union, have determined that the Act violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
12. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
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U.S. allies-denounce the Helms-Burton Act as an extraterritorial
extension of U.S. law and have vowed to fight its implementa-
tion. 13 Some of these countries, including those which comprise
the European Union, as well as Canada and Mexico, have enacted
retaliatory or blocking legislation and have charged that the Act
violates international trade agreements such as the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 14 and the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which created the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
15
This Comment argues that, although the United States uses
international legal principles to support its efforts against Cuba,
the Helms-Burton Act is less consistent with international law and
more a codification of U.S. foreign policy. This distinction is im-
portant because the former operates within a delicate regime that
depends largely on the volition of its followers, while the latter is a
function of U.S. hegemony and the resources-political, economic,
and military-that the United States can bring to bear to effectu-
ate its policies. But, when U.S. power is brought to bear to enforce
a law whose legality among the international community is as least
suspect, if not firmly rejected, the legitimacy of both U.S. power
and international law are threatened.
Part II of this Comment provides a background on the conflict
between Cuba and the United States to place the Helms-Burton
Act in proper context. Part III describes and analyzes the major
on W. Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
104th Cong. 16 (1995) (statement of the Hon. Peter Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs) [hereinafter Tarnoff Statement].
13. See Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Troubleshooter Discovers Big Trouble from Allies
on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at Al; see also John Goshko, 3 Allies Join Call
Against Cuba Embargo, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1996, at A19. In 1996, the United Nations
overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling for an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba.
See Goshko, supra. The United Nations has passed such a resolution in each of the past
five years, but the most recent resolution specifically cited the Helms-Burton Act as vio-
lating the sovereignty of other states and the principles of free trade and navigation. See
id.
14. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
15. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (The Final or "Uruguay" round of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the agreement that produced the World
Trade Organization (WTO)).
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provisions of the Act and their effects, which include diplomatic
protests and condemnations by various countries and commercial
entities, blocking or retaliatory legislation primarily by the Euro-
pean Union, Canada, and Mexico, and charges that the Act vio-
lates NAFTA and GATT. Part IV looks at the broader, potential
long-term consequences of extraterritorial legislation that has ex-
perienced a revival in the 104th Congress.
This Comment concludes that the Helms-Burton Act should
be amended to exclude the provisionsthat operate extraterritori-
ally in order to preserve: (1) the international trade agreements to
which the United States is a party, (2) international law, (3) the in-
tegrity of U.S. foreign policy, and (4) the relationships with foreign
nations that are predisposed to support U.S. policy. It is clearly in
the best interests of the United States to amend the Act in order to
maintain foreign policy consistent with, at the very least, the inter-
national legal principles that it recognizes and to show respect for
the international agreements and bilateral relationships from
which it greatly benefits. Accordingly, Part V provides alterna-
tives that are less offensive, more effective, and more respectful
toward other countries' sovereignty and international law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Initiation of the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba
In the early 1960s, after Fidel Castro wrested control of Cuba
from President Fulgencio Batista, the Cuban government began to
nationalize properties-many of which were owned by foreign na-
tionals or persons who subsequently fled from Cuba to the United
States.16 The restructuring of the Cuban economy led to the
adoption of the Fundamental Law of the Republic,17 which pro-
vided the legal basis for Cuba's confiscatory decrees.'8 In response
16. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of
the U.S. Nationals' Expropriations Claims Against Cubta, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659,
661 (1996).
17. Ley Fundamental de la Republica, No. 5-123, GACETA OFICIAL,'7 Feb. 1959
(Cuba).
18. See MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS 71 (1976) (citing
Ley Fundamental de la Republica, No. 5-123, GACETA OFICIAL, 7 Feb., 1959 (Cuba)).
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to the confiscations, the U.S. Congress passed the 1961 Foreign
Assistance Act, 19 which authorized the President to impose an
economic embargo against Cuba. 20 The following year, Congress
broadened the embargo through the Cuban Assets Control Regu-
lations,21 which restricted Cuba's assets in the United States and
prohibited U.S. citizens or corporations from conducting any
commercial transactions with Cuba.22 Further, Congress identified
and validated property claims against Cuba. In 1964, Congress
amended the 1949 International Claims Settlement Act 23 to enable
U.S. nationals to file claims against the Cuban government.24 To
date, Cuba has compensated none of these claims. 25
B. Subsequent U.S. Policy and Its Effect on Presidential Politics
In the early 1960s, the United States gave Cuban nationals a
refugee status unlike that offered to other foreign nationals.26
Until 1994, Cubans who reached the United States were given im-
mediate asylum. 27 This rule provided the impetus for hundreds of
thousands of Cubans to flee to the United States, seeking refuge
predominantly in southern Florida.28 The demographic change
19. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,22 U.S.C. § 2371(a)(1) (1994).
20. See id. § 2370(a)(1). Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act specifically pro-
hibited giving any assistance to the Cuban government. See Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620, 75 Stat. 424, 444-45. Congress intended a total prohibi-
tion on trade between the United States and Cuba.
21. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1994).
22. See id. The Regulations also restrict cash remittances to Cuba. See id.
23. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 12 (codified in 22 U.S.C. §§
1621-27 (1994)).
24. See Cuban Claims Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994). The Act defines the term
"national" as "a natural person who is a citizen of the United States." Id. § 1643a(l)(A).
25. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 16, at 665.
26. See Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994)).
27. See U.S. Alters Policy, Will Hold Cubans, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 19, 1994, at
Al. The Cuban Adjustment Act gave Cubans the privilege of being released into the cus-
tody of relatives or other sponsors instead of being repatriated. See id.; see also Art Pine,
Cuba Refugees in U.S. Hold Special Immigration Status, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at
A14.
28. Between 1959 and 1980, approximately 800,000 Cubans settled in the United
States, and since then, approximately 200,000 Cubans have arrived. See Legal and Practi-
cal Implications of Title III of the Helms-Burton Law Before the Subcomm. on W. Hemi-
sphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 62
(1996) (prepared statement of Robert L. Muse, Attorney) [hereinafter Muse Statement].
1997] .713
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
over the past thirty-five year period has greatly altered the dy-
namic of presidential politics. Florida now possesses the fourth
largest number of votes in the electoral college, and thus it is a
perennial battleground for candidates seeking the presidency.
29
The battle for the Cuban-American vote has evolved since the
organization of this distinct and sizable constituency in the early
1980s with the formation of the Cuban-American National Foun-
dation (CANF). The CANF is now a powerful lobby that includes
a political action committee which doles out hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in campaign contributions.30 The importance of
the Cuban-American vote in U.S. presidential elections, combined
with the disappearance of subsidies once provided by the Soviet
Union, has made tightening the screws on the U.S. embargo
against Cuba a rarity-a -foreign policy that reaps domestic re-
wards.
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA)31 is a case in
point. In 1992, Congressman (now Senator) Robert Torricelli, a
New Jersey Democrat, introduced the CDA, the precursor to the
Helms-Burton Act.32 The CDA aims to hasten the fall of the Cas-
tro regime in order to pave the way for a democratically-elected
government that respects human rights and that the Cuban mili-
tary does not dominate. 33 To further this goal, the CDA author-
izes the President to impose sanctions on any country that provides
assistance to Cuba.34 Possible sanctions include ineligibility for
29. See Booth Gunther, Campaigns Focus on Florida Factor, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 3,
1996, available in 1996 WL 13982358.
30. See Christopher Marquis & Josh Goldstein, Cuban Exile Lobby is the Most Cost-
Effective, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 24, 1997, at 1A; see also Carla Anne Robbins, Dateline
Washington: Cuban-American Clout, FOREIGN POL., Fall 1992, at 162, 170-73.
31. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1996). The CDA
strengthened the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba by, among other things, prohibit-
ing foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from conducting business in Cuba. See id. §
6005(b)(1).
32. See Robbins, supra note 30, at 166. Torricelli's interest in Cuba policy is a vested
one. In recent years, New Jersey has developed a constituency of 85,000 Cuban-
Americans, which became a key base of support for Torricelli's recent successful cam-
paign for the U.S. Senate. See id. In addition, Torricelli is the second top recipient of
funds from CANF leaders and their Free Cuba political action committee. See Marquis &
Goldstein, supra note 30.
33. See 22 U.S.C. § 6007.
34. See id. § 6003(b)(1).
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U.S. assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or ineli-
gibility for forgiveness or reduction of debts owed to the United
States. 35 The CDA also prohibits vessels that enter a Cuban port
from loading or unloading any freight in U.S. ports for 180 days
following departure from the Cuban port.36 The most controver-
sial of the CDA's provisions prohibits foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies from doing business with Cuba.37  This provision
sparked concern among many U.S. allies because of its extraterri-
torial nature.38
When first presented with legislation that included such a
provision, President George Bush indicated that he could not sign
it because it would apply U.S. law extraterritorially and "'could
force foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to choose between violating
U.S. laws or host country laws.' 39 Two years later, however,
presidential candidate Bill Clinton announced that he liked the
bill.4 0 Weighing the consequences of losing Florida's support in
the 1992 presidential contest, Bush signed the bill, with the extra-
territorial provisions intact.4 1
A similar calculus operated in President Clinton's signing of
the Helms-Burton Act. The bill reached the President's desk
shortly after Cuba shot down two small aircrafts operated by a
Cuban exile group.42 Thus, the political ramifications that signing
the bill would have on the upcoming presidential election strongly
influenced Clinton's decision to sign the bill.4 3 Nonetheless, the
Clinton administration stressed explicit concerns with regard to
the Helms-Burton Act's effects on U.S. trading partners, interna-
35. See id. § 6003(b)(1)(A)-(B).
36. See id. § 6005(b)(1).
37. See id. § 6005.
38. See Bush's Signing of Cuba Embargo Law May Trigger GATT Complaint, EC
Warns, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Oct. 28, 1992).
39. Bush Uses Veto to Block Bill Banning Cuban Trade, CALGARY HERALD, Nov.
17, 1990, at A8.
40. See Robbins, supra note 30, at 167.
41. See id.
42. See Myers, supra note 13.
43. See id.; see also Erlanger, supra note 3 (noting that Clinton's signing of the bill
was a reflection of his eagerness to turn his position 180 degrees in the interest of re-
election and Florida's electoral votes).
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tional trade agreements, and other international commitments.44
Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the Helms-Burton Act poten-
tially conflicts with NIAFTA, GATT, the Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, and arms control cooperation with and
support for democracy in Russia.45 In addition, Tarnoff stressed
the bill's possible conflict with U.S. obligations under the charters
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and
most importantly, with "principles of international law that have
served U.S. business and the U.S. government well."' 46 Despite
these reservations-and the fact that Congress passed a final bill
that included all of the provisions with which the Clinton admini-
stration expressed concern-Clinton ultimately signed the bill.
47
C. The Cuban Foreign Investment Strategy
The Helms-Burton Act was a direct response to a Cuban gov-
ernment policy recently created to respond to the precipitous de-
cline in the Cuban economy that began in the early 1990s after the
Soviet Union withdrew its substantial subsidies to Cuba.48 In or-
der to bolster its economy, Cuba set out to attract foreign invest-
ment by easing the restrictions forbidding foreign ownership of
Cuban land. 49 The Castro government thus made a conscious de-
cision to move from a strict socialist economic model to a hybrid
socialist economic model that resembles the largely successful
economic transitions in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
Vietnam.50 The Helms-Burton Act is clearly a response to Cas-
tro's policy because the Act specifically intends to chill foreign in-
vestors from providing Cuba with the cash that it desperately
44. See Tarnoff Statement, supra note 12; see also Interview with Richard A. Nuccio,
Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Cuba, in U.S.-CUBA
POL'Y. REP., Sept. 20, 1995, at 1.
45. See Tarnoff Statement, supra note 12.
46. Id.
47. See Clinton Signs Bill on Cuba Sanctions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A4; see
also Stephen A. Lisio, Helms-Burton and the Point of Diminishing Returns, 72 INT'L AFF.
691 (1996).
48. See You Can't Get Therefrom Here, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at S3.
49. See Jorge A. Vargas, Introductory Note, Cuba: Foreign Investment Act of 1995,
35 I.L.M. 331 (1996).
50. See id. at 332.
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needs to make the type of transition that the PRC and Vietnam
used to prevent the collapse of their economies.51
III. THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
The Helms-Burton Act is comprised of four titles. 52 The first
two titles consist primarily of a restatement of the U.S. embargo
against Cuba and the conditions and incentives for its termina-
tion. 53 The latter two titles are largely what is new with Cuba pol-
icy, with Title III as the primary focus of the extraterritoriality
charges that have surrounded the Act.54
A. Provisions of the Helms-Burton Act
1. Titles I and II: "Strengthening International Sanctions Against
the Castro Goverment" and "Assistance to a Free and
Independent Cuba"
Title I of the Helms-Burton Act addresses the U.S. desire to
strengthen its economic embargo against Cuba. 55 Title II sets out
the requirements for lifting the economic sanctions and provides a
list of inducements to a transition of government. 56 The Act di-
rects the Secretary of State to instruct the diplomatic corps to
communicate the reasons for the U.S. embargo and to urge foreign
governments to cooperate with U.S. efforts to enforce the em-
bargo.57 Further, the Act underscores the legislation already in
force to sanction Cuba,58 reiterates U.S. opposition to Cuban
51. The Helms-Burton Act identifies the Cuban foreign investment strategy as frus-
trating the effects of the U.S. embargo because foreign investment "provides badly
needed financial benefit" and thus "undermines the foreign policy of the United States."
22 U.S.C. § 6081(6) (1996).
52. During the lengthy debate over the Helms-Burton Act, the four major sections of
the bill came to be referred to as "titles," which is the way each section was labeled be-
fore passage and codification in the United States Code. In common parlance, the sections
that the United States Code refers to as "subchapters" continue to be referred to as
"titles."
53. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021,6061.
54. See id. §§ 6081-6091.
55. See id. § 6032.
56. See id. § 6061.
57. See id. § 6032(b).
58. This legislation includes the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-
6010, the Trading with the Enemy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6004, and the Foreign Assistance Act
1997]
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membership in international financial institutions (IFIs), 59 and an-
nounces the reduction of financial support to IFIs that assist Cuba
financially.60 The Act also expresses Congress' insistence that the
United States oppose any change in the Cuban government's cur-
rent suspension from participation in the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS).
61
In contrast to most other U.S. foreign policy legislation, the
Helms-Burton Act sets out a remarkably detailed prescription as
to how the United States expects to see Cuba develop. Many of its
punitive characteristics, such as the economic sanctions, may end
only when the President determines that Cuba has established a
"democratically elected government" as defined in 22 U.S.C. §
6066.62 In determining whether Cuba has established such a gov-
of 1961,22 U.S.C. § 2494-1. The Helms-Burton Act specifically mentions the Cuban As-
sets Control Regulations set forth in 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1994). See Helms-Burton Act, 22
U.S.C. § 6032(c).
59. See 22 U.S.C. § 6034(a).
60. See id. § 6034(b). Specifically, these IFIs include the International Monetary
Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral In-
vestment Guaranty Agency, and the Inter-American Development Bank. See id. §
6034(b)(2)(c).
61. See id. § 6035. This provision reinforces Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg.
1085 (1962). The Proclamation reiterates the resolutions passed at the Eighth Meeting of
the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS, declaring that "the present
Government of Cuba ... is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-
American system" and calling for OAS member states to "take those steps that they may
consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense." Id. The United
States interpreted these resolutions as authorizing under international law the imposition
of the U.S. embargo and superseding the prohibition against economic sanctions con-
tained in the OAS Charter. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-
Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 420 n.8 (1996). Incidentally, at the OAS annual
meeting in June 1996, the General Assembly unanimously, except for the United States,
criticized the Helms-Burton Act as a violation of international law. See NAFTA Round-
up: OAS Condemns Helms Burton, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., June 15,
1996, available in 1996 WL 10175489.
62. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6065-6066. The prerequisite to a democratically elected gov-
ernment, according to the Helms-Burton Act, is a "transition government." The Act de-
fines a transition government in Cuba as a government that:
(1) has legalized all political activity;
(2) has released all political prisoners and allowed for investigations of Cuban
prisons by appropriate international human rights organizations;
(3) has dissolved the present Department of State Security in the Cuban Minis-
try of the Interior, including the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
and the Rapid Response Brigades; and
718
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ernment, the President must consider some very specific factors.
For example, the President must consider whether Cuban-born
persons returning to Cuba have been allowed to regain their Cu-
ban citizenship.
63
2. Title III: "Protection of Property Rights of United States
Nationals"
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act contains the law's most
controversial provisions. One such provision is 22 U.S.C. § 6082,
which creates a private right of action in U.S. district courts for any
U.S. national who has a claim for property confiscated by Cuba
since January 1, 1959,64 These claims may be made against any
person who "traffics" in or uses such confiscated property.65 A
(4) has made public commitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new
government...
(B) with the participation of multiple independent political parties that
have full access to the media on an equal basis...
(5) has ceased any interference with Radio Marti or Television Marti broadcasts;
(6) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable progress in-
(A) establishing an independent judiciary;
(B) respecting internationally recognized human rights and basic freedoms
as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is
a signatory nation;
(C) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions ... and allow-
ing the establishment of independent social, economic, and political asso-
ciations;
(7) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro...
Id. § 6065(a).
63. See id. § 6065(b)(2)(B) ("In determining whether a transition government in
Cuba is in power, the President shall take into account the extent to which that govern-
ment has made public commitments to, and is making demonstrable progress in permit-
ting the reinstatement of citizenship to Cuban-born persons returning to Cuba.
(emphasis added)).
64. See id. § 6082(a). For the purposes of the Act, the term "United States national"
means: "(A) any United States citizen; or (B) any other legal entity which is organized
under the laws of the United States, or of any State, . . . and which has its principal place
of business in the United States." § 6023(15). Therefore, U.S. national includes indi-
viduals or entities who are now U.S. citizens, but were not at the time Cuba confiscated
the property. The term "property" means any tangible and intangible property, including
future interests, and includes everything from real estate to intellectual property. Id. §
6023(12)(A). The Helms-Burton Act excludes residential real property unless that prop-
erty is "occupied by an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in
Cuba." ld. § 6023(B)(ii).
65. See id. § 6082. A person "traffics" if that person knowingly and intentionally-
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
claimant may also seek treble damages, which can amount to three
times the property's fair market value.
66
Although the group of potential plaintiffs under the Act in-
cludes U.S. citizens who are exiles from Cuba, significant differ-
ences exist in the treatment of those U.S. nationals who have ob-
tained certified claims before the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC) and U.S. nationals who have not. The former
group may bring their actions at any time after August 1, 1996,
while the latter group, which consists largely of persons who were
Cuban exiles at the time of the confiscation but are now U.S. na-
tionals, must wait two years from the date of the Helms-Burton
Act's enactment before filing actions in federal court.67 This pro-
vision does not, however, affect accrual of damages under the Act.
While President Clinton did suspend the right to file suits under
Title III, the suspension does not stay the accrual of damages.
3. Title IV: "Exclusion of Certain Aliens"
Title IV is nearly as controversial as Title III. This provision
seeks to exclude from the United States persons involved in traf-
ficking confiscated U.S. property in Cuba.68 It casts a wide net be-
cause it includes anyone who knowingly and intentionally "causes,
directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking ... by another
person, or otherwise engages in trafficking . . . through another
person. '69 Further, foreign persons who "traffic" can be denied
visas to enter the United States. This includes the spouse, minor
confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of,
manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated prop-
erty,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from trafficking ...without the
authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.
Id. § 6023(13)(A).
66. See id. § 6082(a)(3)(C)(ii).
67. Prior to the Helms-Burton Act, only persons who were U.S. nationals at the time
of the confiscation by the Cuban government could file claims. See Cuban Claims Act, 22
U.S.C. § 1643 (1996). The Cuban Claims Act limited the FCSC's jurisdiction to claims of
persons who were U.S. nationals at the time of their property loss. See id. § 1643a.
68. See id. § 6091 (a).
69. Id. § 6091(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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child, or agent of an excludable person. 70
B. The Helms-Burton Act and Principles of International Law
1. The "Substantial Effect" and "Reasonableness" Doctrines
The drafters of the Helms-Burton Act were clearly aware that
the Act would be criticized for its extraterritorial nature.71 In an-
ticipation of such criticism, they turned to international law for
justification. 72 According to congressional findings, international
law allows a nation to provide for some extraterritoriality:
"International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to pro-
vide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory
that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its terri-
tory."' 73 The findings reflect section 402 of the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatement),
which indicates that some extraterritoriality is permissible: "[A]
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory. ' 74 Section 403 of the Restatement, however,
adds an important limitation: "Even when one of the bases for ju-
risdiction under [section] 402 is present, a state may not exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.'75 Therefore, the key inquiries are:
(1) whether the Helms-Burton Act satisfies the substantial effect
doctrine; and (2) whether the U.S. court's exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign corporations "trafficking" in U.S. property is unrea-
sonable pursuant to the limitation set out in Restatement section
403.
The first inquiry is the target of the legislation. The Cuban
government, not the persons over whom jurisdiction is exercised,
caused the "effect" that the Act targets-the effect being the eco-
70. See id. § 6091 (a)(4).
71. See id. § 6081(9).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1)(c) (1986) (emphasis added).
75. Id. § 403(1) (emphasis added).
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nomic repercussions of the original nationalization of U.S. prop-
erty.76 The exercise of jurisdiction over persons found to be
"trafficking" in U.S. property punishes foreign corporations invest-
ing in Cuba while legally not touching the Cuban government.
Therefore, the Helms-Burton Act can only affect the Cuban gov-
ernment indirectly by deterring foreign investment in Cuba.77
The second inquiry is whether the exercise of jurisdiction un-
der Title III is "reasonable" within the meaning of Restatement
section 403. Because the Helms-Burton Act cannot legally affect
the Cuban government, it is highly questionable whether exercis-
ing jurisdiction over foreign corporations trafficking in U.S. prop-
erty is "reasonable."
Perhaps the best way to construct a definition in this regard
is to determine how "reasonable" the United States would view
similar legislation from another country. In fact, a pair of Cana-
dian legislators, Peter Godfrey and Peter Milliken, introduced
their answer to the Helms-Burton Act in the Canadian House of
Commons. 78 The Godfrey-Milliken Bill would allow descendants
of British loyalists who fled during the American Revolution to
seek compensation from the U.S. government for lost property.79
U.S. State Department, Spokesman Nicholas Burns remarked
"Should the [Godfrey-Milliken] bill become law, I'm sure we'll
give it the same warm welcome that Canada gave Helms-
Burton. ' 80 Incidentally, the American founding fathers promised
to pay restitution for confiscated property, but never have. 81
2. The "Act of State" Doctrine
The drafters of the Helms-Burton Act also anticipated the
"act of state" doctrine as a possible obstacle and proscribed its
application when adjudicating claims brought pursuant to the
76. See Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 431.
77. See Muse Statement, supra note 28.
78. See U.S. Responds in Kind to Canadian Bill Mocking Helms-Burton, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12164183; see also 60 Minutes: 1776 and
All That (CBS Television Broadcast, Oct. 20, 1996) (transcript on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
79. See U.S. Responds in Kind to Canadian Bill Mocking Helms-Burton, supra note
78.
80. Id.
81. See 60 Minutes: 1776 and All That, supra note 78.
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Act.82 The act of state doctrine generally precludes U.S. courts
from inquiring into the validity of public acts that a recognized
sovereign power has committed within its own territory.83 Al-
though neither international law84 nor the U.S. Constitution
85
mandate the act of state doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked
it in 1964 to prevent the U.S. judiciary from inquiring into the va-
lidity of a Cuban government expropriation decree. 86 In response,
Congress enacted the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 87 which
bars the invocation of the doctrine in cases involving foreign ex-
propriation of property where such expropriations were alleged to
have occurred in violation of international law.
88
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino8 9 suggests that circumvention of the act of state doctrine
may be constitutional. 90  Nevertheless, Justice John Marshall
Harlan, writing for eight of the nine Supreme Court Justices, ex-
pressed the "strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engage-
ment in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state
may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both
for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the inter-
82. See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(6) (1996) ("No court of the United States shall decline,
based upon the act of state doctrine, to make a determination on the merits in an action
brought under paragraph (1).").
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 444 (1986); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416
(1964) ("Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sov-
ereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the gov-
ernment of another, done within its own territory." (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897))).
84. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-22 ("No international arbital or judicial decision
discovered suggests that international law prescribes recognition of sovereign acts of for-
eign governments ... ").
85. See id. at 423. In Sabbatino, the Court remarked: "If international law does not
prescribe the use of the doctrine, neither does it forbid application of the rule even if it is
claimed that the act of state in question violated international law." Id. at 422.
86. See id. at 425. The Court analogized the act of state doctrine to the Erie doctrine,
underscoring federal cdurts' function and lack of competence to interpret state law, and
by analogy, likening that to international law. See id. at 421-22.
87. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994) (amending Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-195, § 620, 75 Stat. 424, 444-45).
88. See id.
89. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
90. See id. at 423.
1997]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
national sphere." 91
Insistence that the federal courts circumvent the act of state
doctrine-ignoring the court's limited function in international.
relations and the judiciary's limited competence to pass judgment
on a foreign sovereign's laws-is misappropriation of the judiciary
to perform what is essentially a legislative and executive function.
Executing a foreign policy via the U.S. courts is both an abuse of
the judicial process and an unwise precedent, especially if Con-
gress expands such a practice into other areas of international af-
fairs.92
3. The Nationality of Claims Principle
Another area in which the Helms-Burton Act is at odds with
existing international legal principles is the change in the defini-
tion of who may bring claims before U.S. courts. Over thirty years
ago, the FCSC found: "The principle of international law that eli-
gibility for compensation requires [U.S.] nationality at the time of
loss is so widely understood and universally accepted that citation
of authority is scarcely necessary."
93
The Helms-Burton Act changed this principle by eliminating
the requirement that claimants be U.S. nationals at the time of the
seizure of their property. 94 As a result, the number of potential
suits jumped from thousands under the old definition to hundreds
of thousands under the new definition.95 The inclusion of claim-
ants who were Cuban nationals at the time of the confiscation of
their property, coupled with the expansive definition of "traffic,"
translates into a veritable deluge of potential suits under the
Helms-Burton Act. The number of potential claimants is, how-
ever, simply being used for its deterrent effect on foreign invest-
91. Id.
92. This practice could include further legislation in the same or similar areas, such as
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541.
93. Claim No. IT-10, 252, Dec. No. IT-62 (emphasis added). The FCSC is a U.S.
government agency established to validate the claims of U.S. nationals who have suffered
foreign property losses, often through expropriation. The FCSC is required to employ
international law in reaching its decisions. See Cuban Claims Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643
(1996).
94. See Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4) (1996).




Clearly, by breaking with the established practice of requiring
that claimants be U.S. nationals at the time their property was
confiscated, the United States has done two things. First, it evi-
dently hopes that by greatly increasing the number of potential
claimants, foreign investors will think long and hard before invest-
ing in Cuba. Second, it has essentially invited more Cubans to
seek U.S. citizenship in order employ the power of U.S. courts to
recover damages for their expropriated property. Neither case
justifies the perversion of established international legal principles.
4. The "Requirements" Problem
One of the most troubling aspects of the Helms-Burton Act is
the specificity with which it defines a "transition government" and
a "democratically elected government. '97 The strictures upon the
President to make a factual finding are so tight that it appears only
the complete subjugation of the Cuban government will satisfy the
requirements of the Helms-Burton Act. Indeed, this might explain
some of the foreign discontent with the Act; the United States
looks more like a bully asserting its great power prerogatives than
a serious arbiter of democracy in the Western Hemisphere.
On a domestic level, the stringent requirements placed upon
the President rob the administration of the flexibility required to
effectively maneuver within the delicate realm of international di-
plomacy. Acutely specific foreign policies often breed hostility be-
tween the executive and legislative branches because the admini-
stration will invariably resent being so completely removed from
the foreign policy process. Furthermore, such inflexible policies
lessen the opportunity for an administration to bring its own crea-
tivity to bear on given policy. With regard to the Helms-Burton
Act, President Clinton has chosen to indefinitely suspend the Title
III provision that allows aggrieved parties to file lawsuits. 98 By
signing the bill into law, however,, Clinton has allowed Congress to
limit his opportunities to work with U.S. allies to bring democracy
to Cuba. Traditionally, Presidents have bristled at the idea of
96. See id.
97. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
98. See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Holds Up Cuba Suits, Pleasing Few, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 6, 1997, at Al.
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Congress restricting the executive branch in such a way.99
IV. The Parade of Horribles: The European Union, Canada, and
Mexico v. The Helms-Burton Act
A. Diplomatic Protests, Condemnations, and Blocking or
Retaliatory Legislation
1. The European Union 00
The Helms-Burton Act clearly seeks to effect a regime change
in Cuba.101 Although many countries have no quarrel with that
aim,102 some countries object to the means chosen to further it. 103
The European Union (EU) has found that the Helms-Burton Act
is extraterritorial and, therefore, violates international law. 104 Jac-
ques Santer, Chairman of the European Commission, recently
99. See Bush Uses Veto to Block Bill Banning Cuban Trade, supra note 39. In 1990,
for example, President Bush refused to sign a bill that included a ban on trade with Cuba
by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies because he felt it was impermissibly extraterri-
torial and would interfere with his ability to carry out foreign policy. See id.
100. The European Union consists of 15 nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF
FACTS 1996 at 842 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1995).
101. See22 U.S.C. § 6022(1), (4).
102. See Malcolm Rifkind, Speech at the National Press Club Luncheon, in Federal
News Service, May 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Transcripts file. Speaking
about the Helms-Burton Act, British Foreign Secretary Rifkind commented, "We do not
quarrel with Congress' aims. But we disagree very strongly with the means they envisage.
Secondary boycotts are wrong in principle." Id.
103. See id.; see also US, EU at Friendly Odds over Helms-Burton, WASH. TRADE
DAILY, Sept. 20, 1996, at 2. A European diplomat indicated that the European Union "is
growing more discontented with the Castro regime, but was adamant that slapping on
sanctions is not the correct course to pursue." Id.; see also Andrew Hill, EU to Delay Re-
taliating on American Anti-Cuba Laws, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 9, 1996, at B2 ("'We repeat
our absolute opposition to legislation with extra-territorial effects and our determination
to protect the European Union"' (quoting Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring)).
104. See EU Draft Regulation on Helms-Burton, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Aug. 2, 1996, at 23 see also European Union: Demarches Protesting the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, Mar. 5, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 397. The EU "has
consistently expressed its opposition, as a matter of law and policy, to extraterritorial
applications of U.S. jurisdiction which would also restrict EU trade in goods and services
with Cuba...." Id. at 398.
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stated the EU's position in no uncertain terms: "We do not be-
lieve it is justifiable or effective for one country to impose its tac-
tics on others and to threaten to aid its friends by targeting its ad-
versaries. 10
5
The Helms-Burton Act so offended the Europeans that EU
ministers assembled quickly after the Act's signing to express their
opposition to it.1°6 The EU ministers expressed their displeasure
not only with the extraterritorial provisions of the Act, but also
with the effects that such unilateral measures would have on the
international trade system, particularly the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). 107 Individually, the constituent nations of the EU
expressed various levels of opposition to the Helms-Burton Act-
from disappointment1 08 to outright condemnation. 109 As an entity,
however, the EU's message is clear: it in no way intends to comply
with the Act.1 10
The EU's assault on the Helms-Burton Act is two-pronged.
One approach is to file charges with the WTO and to rely on the
WTO's settlement mechanisms.1 1' At the same time, however, the
EU is also taking unilateral measures. On October 29, 1996, the
EU unanimously approved retaliatory legislation that would allow
Europeans to bring suit to recover damages assessed in U.S. courts
pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act."12
The three major effects of the EU legislation can be described
105. President Clinton Joint News Conference with Italiaf Prime Minister Romano
Prodi and European Commission President Jacques Santer, in Federal News Service, June
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File.
106. See Janet McEvoy, EU to Urge Firms: Ignore U.S. Helms Burton Law, REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., July 29, 1996, at 1.
107. See id.
108. Spain lodged a diplomatic complaint expressing "disagreement" with the Helms-
Burton Act. See Spain Lodges Diplomatic Complaint with Washington, REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., July 2, 1996, at 2.
109. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 103.
110. The EU unanimously adopted blocking legislation to counter the Helms-Burton
Act. See EU to Allow Countqrsuits to Foil U.S. Anti-Cuba Law, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
1996, at Al.
111. See Charles Bremner, Europe Challenges Anti-Cuba Laws at World Trade Body,
TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6523351; see also Julie Wolf, EU
Plans to Ask WTO to Rule on U.S. Law, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,1996, at 2.
112. See Stephanie Griffith, U.S. Draws Fire over Cuba Trade Curbs: European Union
Officials Agree to Retaliate over Helms-Burton Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1996, at C2.
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as non-recognition, noncompliance, and countersuit. First, the EU
legislation states that no member state shall recognize any foreign
judgment that violates international law, namely a judgment that
results from an extraterritorial law.113 Second, the law forbids any
person from complying with extraterritorial laws either actively or
by deliberate omission.1 14 Third, the legislation entitles any person
against whom a foreign country enters a judgment to seek recovery
of that sum from the original plaintiff in the courts of the Euro-
pean Community.1
15
The EU legislation has the potential of putting European
companies presently doing business in Cuba in a difficult posi-
tion. 116 On the one hand, continuing to "traffic" in confiscated
property places European companies at risk of triggering lawsuits
and expulsions inder the Helms-Burton Act. On the other hand,
obeying or complying with any of the Helms-Burton Act's provi-
sions puts these companies at risk of suffering EU fines.
At some stage, each company will have to weigh the conse-
quences of each action and choose which course imposes the
lighter penalty: doing or not doing business in Cuba. Further, de-
pending on how vigorously the EU intends to enforce its counter-
measures, there seems to be a wide array of interpretations as to
what constitutes "compliance." Carried to an extreme, compliance
may include a decision not to invest in Cuba where there was a de-
veloped or announced plan to do so, regardless of whether the
company bases its decision on its own, independent factors or on a
calculus that weighs the potential punishment under the Helms-
Burton Act.
While the potential consequences of the EU measure might
lead to the belief that the EU is merely fighting fire with fire-to
113. See EU Draft Regulation on Helms-Burton, supra note 104, art. 4, reprinted in
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 2, 1996, at 23, 24.
1-14. See id. at art. 5. reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 2, 1996, at 23, 24.
115. See id. at art. 6. reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 2, 1996, at 23, 24.
116. Spain's biggest investor in Cuba, Sol Melia hotel group, has said that it would
cancel plans to build hotels in Orlando and Miami in favor of continuing operations in
Cuba, but such a move does not necessarily immunize it from the reach of the Helms-
Burton Act. See Canadian Company Penalized Under Helms-Burton, CARIBBEAN
UPDATE, Aug. 1, 1996, at 1. Italian telecommunications company Societa Finanziaria
Telefonica per Azioni (STET) is also subject to the Helms-Burton Act because it uses
properties that formerly belonged to U.S. company IlT Corp. See id.
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the detriment of the international free trade system that it hopes to
preserve-the alternative could prove worse. If the Europeans
obey the Helms-Burton Act, a dangerous precedent could be set.
The United States might be encouraged to use further extensions
of U.S. law to influence foreign policy in other areas of the world.
Indeed, the United States has already shown such willingness with
President Clinton's recent signing of legislation to punish foreign
companies that invest in the Iranian and Libyan oil sectors.117
The Europeans would be committing utter folly if they ne-
glected to oppose the Helms-Burton Act. Unless Congress ceases
to enact the type of extraterritorial legislation that it has recently
passed, the EU would find a great deal more of its foreign and
trade policies being written in Washington rather than in Europe.
2. Canada
Canada, like the EU, has taken a two-pronged approach to
fighting the Helms-Burton Act. The first is to join the EU in its
fight to convene a settlement panel under the auspices of the
WTO. 118 The second, like the EU, is to act unilaterally to protect
its interests. The Canadian House of Commons passed blocking
legislation, which Prime Minister Jean Chr6tien's government
sponsored, that seeks to bar enforcement in Canada of judgments
rendered in U.S. courts based on the Helms-Burton Act.1 19
The Canadians have been among the most vehement of the
Helms-Burton Act's detractors.1 20 After several condemnations of
U.S. policy, the Canadian government introduced legislation to
117. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541;
See also Toby Roth, New Iranian-Libyan Sanctions Will Only Hurt U.S., WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 1996, at A14.
118. See Canada to Join EU in Challenging U.S. Anti-Cuba Law, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct.
3, 1996, at A3.
119. See Bill C-54, An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 35th
Parl. (1996) (Can.). The original Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA) appears
at R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985) (Can.).
120. See Government of Canada, News Release, Government Introduces Legislation to
Counter U.S. Helms-Burton Act, News Release of the (Sept. 16, 1996). Canada's Interna-
tional Trade Minister, Art Eggleston, remarked: "Helms-Burton is an unwarranted move
to extend the arm of U.S. law into trade between countries. The FEMA changes are a
deterrent against U.S. companies seeking to penalize Canadian firms doing legitimate
business in Cuba." Id.
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amend the 1984 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA)
121
to include retaliatory provisions against the Helms-Burton Act.
122
Similar to the EU legislation, the FEMA amendments authorize
the Canadian government to issue "blocking" orders to prevent
the enforcement in Canada of judgments based on foreign laws
deemed objectionable-in this case, extraterritorial. 123 Unlike the
EU legislation, however, the FEMA amendments explicitly target
the Helms-Burton Act.124 In addition, the legislation includes a
"clawback" provision to provide a Canadian forum for Canadian
companies to recover damages paid pursuant to Title III suits from
the original plaintiff. 125 The Canadian law also provides for an
award of court costs for the suits in both countries.126 The Cana-
dian judgment applies against the U.S. plaintiff's assets in Can-
ada. 12
7
The FEMA amendments also seek to deter Canadians from
complying with the Helms-Burton Act by increasing the penalties
for compliance from C$10,000 under the original FEMA to C$1.5
million under the amended FEMA. 128 By comparison, the penal-
ties under the U;S. law can only reach U.S. $1 million.
129
The FEMA amendments have a great potential for putting
Canadian companies in a precarious position. Undoubtedly, like
European firms, Canadian companies will have to weigh a decision
to conduct business in Cuba against the legal and economic conse-
quences that such a decision might produce. One Canadian com-
pany already chose to ignore the deterrent intent of the Helms-
Burton Act even before the passage of the FEMA amendments.
Sherritt International Corporation, (Sherritt) a Canadian nickel
mining company with $200 million invested in CUba, sent a clear
121. For6ign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985) (Can.).
122. See Bill C-54, An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 35th
Par!. (1996) (Can.).
123. See id. § 4.
124. See id. § 7. The law expressly indicates: "Any judgment given under the law of
the United States entitled Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of
1996 shall not be recognized or enforceable in any manner in Canada." Id.
125. See id. § 9.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. § 7.
129. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R pt. 515 (1994).
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signal that it intends to ignore the Helms-Burton Act.130 Although
it previously held meetings in Toronto and London, it recently
convened a meeting of its board of directors in Havana, Cuba.131
While the Helms-Burton Act does not per se bar doing business in
Cuba, Sherritt seized the opportunity to send a message that it
clearly intends to continue its relationship with Cuba and to use
property expropriated by the Cuban government.
Sherritt's executives have already been targets of the Helms-
Burton Act's exclusionary policy. In July 1996, the U.S. State De-
partment sent a letter to Sherritt's top executives indicating that
Sherritt was violating the Act and, therefore, the executives and
their families were barred from the United States.132 The real test
of the Helms-Burton Act, however, namely liability under the Ti-
tle III lawsuit provision, has yet to materialize because President
Clinton recently suspended that provision until June of 1997.133
3. Mexico
Like the EU and Canada, Mexico has also chosen both unilat-
eral and multilateral measures to counter the Helms-Burton Act.
It has chosen to join Canada in an effort to convene a NAFTA
dispute resolution panel, charging that the Helms-Burton Act vio-
lates NAFTA. 134 In addition, Mexico has taken its own initiative;
on October 23, 1996, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo signed
the Law for the Protection of Trade and Investment from Foreign
Regulations Which Infringe Upon International Law. 135 The
Mexican law, which is less strident than either the EU or Canadian
130. See Pascal Fletcher, Sherritt Risks U.S. Ire with Cuba Meeting, FIN. POST, Sept. 12,
1996, at 1. Sherritt is currently using properties that were once owned by Louisiana-based
Freeport-MacMoran Co., which has a multi-million dollar outstanding claim. See id.; see
also Canadian Companies Take Steps to Minimize Impact of Helms-Burton, N. AM. FREE
TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., July 31, 1996, at 1.
131. See Fletcher supra note 130.
132. See Canadian Company Penalized Under Helms-Burton, supra note 116.
133. See Rossella Brevetti & Peter Menyasz, Clinton Delays Lawsuits Under Title III
of Helms-Burton, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1158 (July 17, 1996); see also Clinton Extends
Suspension of Right to Sue Under Helms-Burton, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-12
(Jan. 6, 1997).
134. See Canada and Mexico Vow to Fight Anti-Cuba Trade Law, N. AM. FREE
TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., June 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10175521.
135. See Mexico Law Counters U.S. Pressure on Cuba, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 24,
1996, at 3.
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measures, encourages Mexican individuals or companies that may
be affected by "extraterritorial effects of foreign laws" to inform
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade
and Industrial Development. 136 The law also prohibits Mexican
individuals or companies from providing information to foreign
courts or other authorities acting to enforce such extraterritorial
laws.' 37 Further, the law directs Mexican courts to refuse to rec-
ognize U.S. decisions or judgments rendered pursuant to the
Helms-Burton Act and has a countersuit provision.138 Violation of
the Mexican law can result in fines ranging from $3,000 to
$300,000.139
The first major Mexican company caught in the crossfire be-
tween the U.S. and Mexican legislation was Grupo Domos, a
Mexican telecommunications company that had invested $706
million in Cuba.140 The U.S. State Department sent letters to
Grupo Domos executives indicating that Grupo Domos was in
violation of the Helms-Burton Act because it was "trafficking" in
U.S. property, and thus, that the executives and their families were
barred from entering the United States)141
B. Charges of International Trade Agreement Violations
In addition to their unilateral efforts, the EU, Canada, and
Mexico have complained that the Helms-Burton Act violates the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which created the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
1. NAFTA
The NAFTA accords, which were signed into law in 1994,
136. See Law for the Protection of Trade and Investment for Foreign Regulations
Which Infringe upon International Law art. 3, OFFICIAL GAZETTE MEX., Oct. 23, 1996,
at 9.
137. See id., art 2, at 9.
138. See id. arts. 4-5, at 9.
139. See id. art. 9, it 10. Article 9 specifically provides that article 2 violations may
result in "a fine of up to 50,000 days of minimum daily general salary, in effect in the Fed-
eral District." Id.; see also Mexico Law Counters U.S. Pressure on Cuba, supra note 135.
140. See Jose de Cordoba, Mexico's Domos Catches U.S.-Cuba Heat, WALL ST. J.,




promote the principles of free trade among the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. Canada and Mexico contend that the
Helms-Burton Act violates NAFTA in both practice and princi-
ple.142
Specifically, section 6091 of the Helms-Burton Act, which
provides for the exclusion of persons found to be trafficking in
U.S. property, appears to violate chapter 1603 of NAFTA, which
grants U.S. entry to foreign businessmen who are otherwise quali-
fied. 143 The exclusion of Canadian and Mexican businessmen
solely on the basis of their investment in Cuba has angered both
countries' governments to the point that the two have requested a
dispute settlement panel under NAFTA to resolve their disagree-
ments with the U.S. law.144
On a more general level, however, the Helms-Burton Act ap-
pears to interfere with the principles of free trade embodied in
NAFTA. Both Canada and Mexico complain that the Helms-
Burton Act effectively interferes with the very trade liberalization
measures that NAFTA was designed to promote. 145 The Clinton
administration, as might be expected, argues that the Helms-
Burton Act is "fully consistent" with U.S. international obliga-
tions.146
In August 1996, the Clinton administration hinted, however,
that if pressed on the issue, it would defend the Helms-Burton Act
142. See U.S. Trading Partners Anticipate Implementation of Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, U.S.- CUBA POLICY REP., May 31, 1996, at
1.
143. See id.
144. See Canada and Mexico Vow to Fight Anti-Cuba Trade Law, supra note 134; see
also United States Trade: State Department Issues Visa Denial Guidelines Under Helms-
Burton Measure, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., June 30, 1996, available in
1996 WL 10175518; Mexico Continues to Fight Helms-Burton Law, N. AM. FREE TRADE
& INVESTMENT REP., July 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10175535. For a discussion of
Mexican opposition particularly, see Mexico Protests U.S. Barring Domos Chiefs Under
Cuba Law, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 22, 1996, at D2.
145. For a specific discussion of Canada's complaints, see Peter Menyasz, Canada
Plans Legislation to Counter Helms-Burton Law, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1008 (June 19,
1996).
146. NAFTA Round-Up: Helms-Burton May Be Defended on National Security
Grounds, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., Aug. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL
1017589.
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under NAFTA's "national security" exemption. 147 Recently, the
Clinton Administration has publicly indicated that it might for-
mally invoke the exemption.148 Chapter 2102 of NAFTA governs
the extent to which a government may take action that would oth-
erwise be inconsistent with NAFTA in order to protect its
"essential national security interests. ' 149 Like international law it-
self, interpretations of "national security" imperatives are highly
subjective and rely almost exclusively on the good faith and good
judgment of the nations that invoke them. In terms of NAFTA,
the formal invocation of national security to defend the Helms-
Burton Act could set a precedent that would encourage other
countries to defend their trade barriers as "vital to national secu-
rity.' 5 0 While a slippery slope scenario need not be drawn,
stretching the national security exemption to allow the effectua-
tion of one nation's foreign policy-without a clear national secu-
rity threat-could eviscerate the very principles of free trade that
NAFTA was drafted to uphold.
2. GATT/WTO
While Canada and Mexico have pursued settlement proce-
dures under NAFTA, they have also joined the EU in pressing for
the formation of an investigative panel under the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB).151 On November 20, 1996, after an ear-
lier rejection of such an action, the United States accepted the
formation of a panel that would investigate the effects of the
Helms-Burton Act. 152 Later, on February 20, 1997, after the panel
was appointed, the United States said that the newly-created panel
lacked competence to proceed because the issue did not concern a
trade dispute, but rather a U.S. national security matter. 153 The
consequences of such an investigation could be wide-ranging in-
147. See id.
148. See David E. Sanger, U.S. Rejects Role for World Court in Trade Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al.
149. NAFTA, supra note 14, ch. 2102 (emphasis added).
150. NAFTA Round-Up: Helms-Burton May Be Defended on National Security
Grounds, supra note 146.
151. See WTO Investigation of Helms-Burton on Track: U.S. Accepts Panel Formation,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) A-3 (Nov. 21,1996).
152. See id.
153. See Sanger, supra note 148.
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deed for both the United States and the international trade system.
First, if the WTO panel finds that the Helms-Burton Act vio-
lates the WTO, the United States would find itself in a difficult
position. It could be forced either to repeal the portions of the Act
that conflict with the WTO or maintain the Act and defend it as
consistent with its international obligations.
The United States, however, has chosen a third option: re-
casting the dispute as a matter of U.S. national security instead of
a trade issue.1 54 If the United States eventually chooses to for-
mally invoke "national security" to defend the Helms-Burton Act,
the consequences for the future of the WTO could be dire. Invok-
ing a national security exemption to defend a policy with such
tenuous national security implications might cast into doubt the
U.S. commitment to international free trade or encourage others
to do the same and risk the unraveling of the agreement.
Such a consequence would not only bode ill for the fledgling
trade organization-which is the product of almost fifty years of
GATT negotiations155-but also could have wide-ranging conse-
quences for the United States and its ability to maintain interna-
tional support for multilateral agreements in others fields. Nuclear
non-proliferation, combating international terrorism, and interna-
tional peacekeeping efforts are but a few such ventures in which
U.S. leadership is vital to success.
U.S. repudiation of a WTO settlement panel decision would
also affect U.S. domestic policy. To allow a lack of commitment
by the United States to decimate the WTO-after such a long
struggle for the WTO by the United States in general and the Clin-
ton administration in particular-would work at cross-purposes
with the Clinton administration's other stated goals. First, Clinton
fought hard for both the WTO and NAFTA and has been tough
on opening up the Japanese, Chinese, and other markets to U.S.
goods. 156 In addition, he has indicated that he wants to enlarge
NAFTA to include at least Chile and to expand free trade along
154. See id.
155. For a review of these negotiations, see A Brief History of GA TT (visited Nov. 19,
1996) <http://www.unicc.oig/wto/2-2_0_wpf.html#Uruguay>.
156. See Hilary Stout & Carla Anne Robbins, Clinton Is Seeking a Free-Trade Legacy,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1996, at 8.
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the Pacific Rim.157
Maintaining the Helms-Burton Act threatens another prong
in the U.S. tiade policy, namely the stated goal of strengthening
international financial institutions (IFIs). In a speech to the Bret-
ton Woods Committee, U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin
identified IFIs as "absolutely vital [to] promoting growth and re-
form in the developing world. '1 58 The Act's call for the diminu-
tion of funds to IFIs that assist Cuba risks the U.S. commitment to
multilateral institutions and ultimately risks the institutions them-
selves, particularly those that rely on U.S. leadership and financial
support.
V. EXTRATERRITORIAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
The controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton Act has in-
cluded vociferous protest from U.S. and international business in-
terests decrying the Act as extraterritorial, 159 a danger to the in-
ternational legal order,160 and tantamount to a secondary
boycott16 1-a practice that the United States itself has de-
nounced.1 62 The Mobil Oil Corporation took out a full-page ad-
vertisement in The Economist to urge the U.S. government to re-
think its use of what Mobil called a secondary boycott to "tighten
[the U.S.] economic grip. ' 163 In addition, the Trans-Atlantic Busi-
ness Dialogue, a coalition of U.S. and European business leaders,
recently convened in Chicago and urged the repeal of the extra-
territorial provisions of recent U.S. sanctions legislation, including
157. See id.
158. Rubin Calls for Strengthening International Financial Institutions, WHITE HOUSE
BULL., Nov. 15, 1996, at 5.
159. See EC Official Welcomes Business Declaration on Extraterritorial Laws, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-19 (Nov. 15, 1996).
160. See Secondary Boycotts: Squeeze Plays That Hurt Everyone, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2,
1996, at 24, 24.
161. See id. A secondary boycott is a tactic whereby country A says that if X, a na-
tional of country C, trades with country B, X may not trade with country A. See Lowen-
feld, supra note 61, at 429. Essentially, X is given the choice of trading with country A,
the boycotting country, or with country B, the target country, although under the law of
country C, where X is established, trade with both countries A and C is permitted. See id.
162. See Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 430. The United States denounced the Arab
boycott of Israel. See id.
163. Secondary Boycotts: Squeeze Plays That Hurt Everyone, supra note. 160.
[Vol. 19:709736
Helms-Burton Act
the Helms-Burton Act.164 Furthermore, the National Foreign
Trade Council, a U.S. organization representing 500 of the largest
U.S. multinational corporations, met in September 1996 to discuss
the best approach to reversing or diluting the recent spate of uni-
lateral sanctions legislation.
165
Many in the U.S. business community feel unfairly excluded
from the Cuban market while European and other countries' com-
panies take advantage of the U.S. exclusion from Cuba.166 As a
general matter, U.S. businesses dislike unilateral sanctions meas-
ures because such measures put U.S. businesses at a disadvantage
vis-A-vis foreign companies. 167 U.S. and international businesses
seem to be wary of the embargo against Cuba, indeed of unilateral
sanctions legislation in general, for two additional reasons: (1) In
an integrated global economy, unilateral sanctions measures have
proven ineffective; and (2) They work to destabilize the global
trade system, particularly when combined with extraterritorial
means.
A recent study of sanctions legislation over several decades
found that such measures are ineffective unless there is a broad
base of support for the sanctions.168 Indeed, sanctions were most
effective when they were multilateral, such as the international ef-
fort against apartheid in South Africa. 169 If such a finding is true,
most free-trade supporters may not be simply motivated by greed
in opposing unilateral sanctions, but may be concerned with ex-
clusion from a market to further a strategy that has questionable
merit. 170
164. See EC Official Welcomes Business Declaration on Extraterritorial Laws, supra
note 159.
165. See Louis Uchitelle, Who's Punishing Whom?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at C1.
166. See Stanley Meisler, International Business Desire to Reopen Cuba to American
Investment Goes Unfulfilled, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at D4. Dwayne Andreas, chief
executive officer of Archer-Daniels-Midland, an agribusiness conglomerate, remarked,
"'1 think it's just ridiculous that everyone in the world is free to do business in Cuba ex-
cept us here in America."' Id.
167. See Uchitelle, supra note 165.
168. See id. (citing, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L ECON., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RE-
CONSIDERED (1990)).
169. See id.
170. Many business entities, including multinational corporations, non-governmental
organizations, and trade associations, argue that the infusion of market capitalism
achieves better results than unilateral sanctions. See Lucio A. Noto, Where We Are
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The systemic effects that unilateral sanctions-and particu-
larly sanctions that employ extraterritorial means-have on inter-
national trade, cause concern among many in the international
business arena.171 The National Association of Manufacturers, for
example, has expressed concern that the Helms-Burton Act and
the Iran-Libya Oil Sanctions Act may endanger future U.S. sales
to countries that currently do business with either Cuba, Iran, or
Libya. 172 Although these Acts may have a negative effect on U.S.
exports, and in turn the U.S. economy, there is a much broader
concern. Donald Fites, chairman of Caterpillar, Inc., a heavy ma-
chinery company, finds that "'the real pressure is on the U.S. com-
panies that not only must cede American jobs to foreign firms, but
also risk being branded in other markets as unreliable suppli-
ers.'" 17
3
The United States has great influence in the world and is ill-
served by being hypocritical with respect to international law.
Precisely because the United States often does not benefit from
unilateral sanctions and other forms of "force," it is in the U.S. in-
terest to adhere to international legal principles that foreign coun-
tries can respect and follow without feeling prey to U.S. hegem-
ony. In addition, it is a risky venture to jeopardize the disruption
of long-established international legal principles and business cus-
toms in the furtherance of a policy that has proven its worthless-
ness.
VI. ALTERNATIVES
At the heart of the Helms-Burton Act controversy is the un-
derlying debate as to whether to increase pressure on the Castro
regime or to flood Cuba with market capitalism to provoke the
types of changes that marked the transitions to democracy in East-
ern Europe. There is over thirty-five years of evidence to support
the contention that increasing pressure not only is ineffective, but
Heading: Remarks at the Offshore Northern Seas Conference (Aug. 27, 1996); see also
Franklin L. Lavin, Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma, FOREIGN POL'Y.,
Fall 1996, at 139. See generally BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS (1988).
171. See Secondary Boycotts: Squeeze Plays That Hurt Everyone, supra note 160; see
also Uchitelle, supra note 165.




also damages U.S. relationships with other nations and puts U.S.
businesses at a disadvantage with regard to Cuba. Therefore, the
best alternative is to repeal the Helms-Burton Act altogether and
formulate a Cuba policy around U.S. principles that reflect sound
international legal concepts. The re-election of Jesse Helms, who
retains the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, en-
sures that such a repeal is unlikely. Nevertheless, if Congress
wishes to maintain its policy, it would be wise to make adjustments
to the existing law.
Congress might reformulate what constitutes the transition to
a democratically elected government in Cuba. To replace the cur-
rent litany of specific requirements with more general principles
would both respect Cuba's sovereignty and would indicate to U.S.
allies that the United States would accept a democratization proc-
ess in Cuba that is not entirely an American one. This change
might garner support from other Latin American nations because
the United States would appear less prone to asserting its great
power prerogatives in the Caribbean basin and more willing to
work on a constructive solution to democratize Cuba-the only
non-democratic nation in the Western Hemisphere.
Wisconsin Congressman Toby Roth advanced a series of
amendments that would make the Act more flexible. Before final
passage of the Act, Roth proposed amendments that would offer a
series of aid commitments tied to the determination of a transition
government. 174 These commitments included: (1) negotiation of
either the return of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay to
Cuba or renegotiation of the present agreement; (2) development
assistance; (3) financial guarantees under the Export-Import Bank
of the United States and support under the Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation for investments in Cuba; (4) relief of Cuba's
external debt; (5) military adjustment assistance; (6) renegotiation
of Most Favored Nation trade status; and (7) negotiation of Cuba's
inclusion in NAFTA.175 Such initiatives would provide Cuba-
and Castro-with real incentives for change, instead of leaving
Cuba with a full ballot box and an empty bread box. Indeed,
democratic reforms are hardly enticing without concurrent reforms
174. See The Three Roth Amendments, U.S.-CUBA POL'Y., July 19, 1995, at 2, 2.
175. See id.
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to improve Cuba's ailing economy.
In addition, Congress would have to change the Helms-
Burton Act to respect current U.S. obligations under NAFTA.
Specifically, the United States would have to repeal the exclusion
of persons under Title IV. The continued exclusion of foreign
businessmen undermines the U.S. commitment to increased hemi-
spheric free trade, which the United States has worked so labori-
ously to promote.
The most difficult change concerns the Title III provision con-
ferring a right of action on persons who were not U.S. nationals at
the time of their property loss. Because the provision offends most
principles of jurisdiction and effectively acts as a secondary boy-
cott, its efficacy, either as an international legal principle or a U.S.
foreign policy, cannot be sustained. Admittedly, the changes re-
quired to make the Helms-Burton Act conform with international
legal principles would effectively emasculate the law. At the very
least, however, the potential claimants should be limited to per-
sons or companies who were U.S. nationals at the time of their
property confiscation. In this way, the United States would only
be protecting the rights of its own nationals, ingtead of becoming a
forum for foreign claimants.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Helms-Burton Act is bad law. Although it purports to
advance liberty and democracy in the Western Hemisphere, it is
little more than a foreign policy adorned with the legal equivalent
to the emperor's clothing. This type of policy is unwise because in
the international arena, like the political arena in general, what
may be defensible on technical legal grounds does not always
translate into good policy. Worse, vehemently defending as legal
under international law a policy that is facially incongruous with
established international legal principles exposes the type of hy-
pocrisy that can easily undermine the confidence in the interna-
tional legal order upon which many countries and business inter-
ests rely.
Indeed, it is a dangerous precedent for the United States to
codify a U.S. foreign policy and insist that it be followed by third-
party countries that are not the target of the policy and whose own
policies diverge from the U.S. policy, especially when the implica-
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tions for those third-party countries are so dire. Such a policy can
only breed resentment toward the United States-not only with
regard to the policy in question, but also in other areas of policy.
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